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ABSTRACT
A conceptual method is presented for upgrading exist-
ing GPS user equipment, without requiring hardware or
software modifications to the equipment, to improve the
equipment’s position, velocity, and time (PVT) accuracy,
to increase its PVT robustness in weak-signal or jammed
environments, and to protect the equipment from coun-
terfeit GPS signals (GPS spoofing). The method is em-
bodied in a device called the GPS Assimilator that cou-
ples to the radio frequency (RF) input of an existing GPS
receiver. The Assimilator extracts navigation and timing
information from RF signals in its environment—including
non-GNSS signals—and from direct baseband aiding pro-
vided, for example, by an inertial navigation system, a
frequency reference, or the GPS user. The Assimilator
optimally fuses the collective navigation and timing infor-
mation to produce a PVT solution which, by virtue of the
diverse navigation and timing sources on which it is based,
is highly accurate and inherently robust to GPS signal ob-
struction and jamming. The Assimilator embeds the PVT
solution in a synthesized set of GPS signals and injects
these into the RF input of a target GPS receiver for which
an accurate and robust PVT solution is desired. A proto-
type software-defined Assimilator device is presented with
three example applications.
INTRODUCTION
What will GNSS receivers look like five years from now?
The answer, of course, depends on the application. Mass-
market receivers used in applications that do not require
precision positioning and timing (e.g., hand-held units for
hikers) will likely remain simple single-frequency L1-C/A-
based GPS devices. On the other hand, a growing segment
of military and civilian GNSS users will demand greater
accuracy and reliability from their receivers than can be of-
fered by single-frequency GPS. They will want their GNSS
devices to be multi-frequency to combat ranging errors due
to ionospheric delay, and multi-system to improve satellite
availability and robustness against signal interference.
Major commercial GNSS receiver manufacturers already
have product roadmaps in place that anticipate these de-
mands. Manufacturers realize that they will be at a com-
petitive disadvantage relative to their peers if they only
offer a subset of available GNSS signals to sophisticated
users. “Why should I have to choose between signals?”
their customers will complain, “I’d like all of them!”
Then there is the issue of GNSS security. There was a
time, perhaps 20 years ago or more, when computer users
were largely unconcerned with the security of their per-
sonal computers. That time has passed. As any victim
of a computer virus knows, firewalls, anti-virus software,
and protocols for secure data transfer are no longer op-
tional, but required. Likewise, the deepening dependence
of the civil infrastructure on GNSS—especially for timing
synchronization—and the potential for financial gain or
high-profile mischief make civil GNSS jamming and spoof-
ing a gathering threat. Since the publication of the U.S.
Department of Transportation’s Volpe Report on GPS
dependence nearly a decade ago [1], GNSS security re-
searchers have repeatedly warned that civil GPS is not yet
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secure, and that users trust its signals at their peril. As
Professor David Last commented at a recent conference
on GNSS security, “Navigation is no longer about how to
measure where you are accurately. That’s easy. Now it’s
how to do so reliably, safely, robustly.”
Secure positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) will re-
quire use of all available means: inertial navigation sys-
tems, stable frequency sources, multiple antennas [2], cryp-
tographic authentication [3], and all radio frequency sig-
nals from which PNT information can be extracted—
including non-GNSS signals and signals never intended to
be used for PNT.
In short, PNT devices in critical applications five years
from now will likely be remarkably capable and secure de-
vices that adhere to an all-signals-in-view, all-available-
means philosophy.
Meanwhile, however, the overwhelming majority of GNSS
receivers—even those in critical applications—are simple
L1 C/A-based devices that fail when signals are blocked
or jammed, complaining “Need clear view of sky.” What
is more, no commercially-available civil GNSS receiver, as
far as the authors are aware, incorporates even rudimen-
tary defenses against spoofing. Are these receivers to be
considered obsolete? Perhaps. And perhaps the prudent
course of action is to replace them with secure and reliable
modern devices.
A decision to replace existing receivers, however, cannot
be made lightly. The hundreds of thousands of deployed
GNSS receivers across the globe today represent an enor-
mous investment in equipment and training. Moreover, in
many cases the GNSS receiver is only an embedded sub-
component of a larger PNT-reliant system. It may be in-
convenient, unsafe, or expensive to replace these embedded
devices with modern counterparts. Nonetheless, the vul-
nerability of existing receivers, embedded and otherwise,
to signal obstruction, jamming, and spoofing, and their in-
ability to make use of modernized GNSS signals and other
signals of opportunity, leaves much to be desired.
As an alternative to replacement of existing equipment,
this paper proposes augmentation. A technique has been
developed for upgrading existing GNSS user equipment to
address their shortcomings without requiring hardware or
software modifications to the equipment. The technique
re-purposes the portable civil GPS spoofer described in
[4] to generate “friendly” spoofing signals whose implied
navigation solution is derived from a fusion of GPS and
other observables. The technique is embodied in a device,
called the GPS Assimilator, whose output is injected di-
rectly into the radio frequency (RF) input of existing GPS
equipment to immediately robustify the equipment against
GPS outages and interference.
Consider three examples of existing devices for which As-
similator augmentation is potentially preferable to replace-
ment:
Time Reference Receivers These devices, which typi-
cally cost several thousand dollars apiece, couple a GPS
receiver to a stable OCXO or atomic frequency reference.
They are used extensively in telecom networks; in partic-
ular, the IS-95 CDMA-based digital cellular standard and
its progeny require each base station to be synchronized
with a GPS receiver so that the timing of transmissions
can be controlled to better than 10 µs. Modern time refer-
ence receivers easily meet this requirement. They are also
capable of extended (24-36 hours) “holdover mode” oper-
ation in case of signal blockage or jamming. Nonetheless,
recent experiments with a popular time reference receiver
model at the University of Texas Radionavigation Labora-
tory have revealed that these receivers are easily spoofed.
Within the span of one hour, the pulse-per-second output
of a receiver originally locked to authentic GPS signals can
be driven to a larger than 10-µs error without raising any of
the receiver’s internal alarms. The obvious implication—
that it would take a malefactor less than one hour to render
a cell-phone base station inoperable via spoofing—is cause
for concern. Unfortunately, due to the tight coupling be-
tween the GPS receiver and the oscillator it disciplines, the
GPS receiver component cannot be easily swapped with a
modern, secure version.
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) Also known as
synchrophasors, these devices couple a GPS receiver to
power measurement equipment in order to simultaneously
obtain the phasor values of voltages and currents at partic-
ular instants of time [5]. Although currently used primar-
ily for monitoring, it is anticipated that these devices will
see widespread future use in closed-loop control systems
designed to increase the carrying capacity of the power
distribution grid. The installed base of PMUs represents
a considerable investment. Unfortunately, like time ref-
erence receivers, the GPS receivers coupled to PMUs are
easily spoofed. Timing errors lead to phasor angle errors,
and, when these reach several degrees (∼100 µs), they can
destabilize closed-loop control of transient swings.
Embedded Military GPS Receivers Unsurprisingly,
GPS receivers find widespread use in armed forces world-
wide. Several hundred thousand devices have been pro-
cured by the armed forces of the United States and foreign
military sales customers over the last five years—a sub-
stantial collective investment. A large fraction of military-
grade GPS receivers are used as embedded receivers, being
coupled to targeting, tracking, and communications equip-
ment via well-defined and field-tested interfaces. These
critical downstream systems can be rendered inoperable
when incoming GPS signals are blocked or jammed. Coun-
terintuitive as it may seem that a vehicle-to-vehicle com-
munications system would be disabled by GPS blockage,
such is the nature of modern dependence on precision nav-
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igation and timing.
Each of these example devices would see benefits in accu-
racy, robustness, or security from coupling to an Assimi-
lator. The following section describes the Assimilator as
a conceptual device. Thereafter, a working prototype is
introduced and initial experimental results are given.
I. CONCEPTUAL ASSIMILATOR
The Assimilator concept is based on the principle that
from virtually any modern environment one can extract
a wealth of navigation and timing-related information.
Thus, the Assimilator behaves opportunistically, scanning
ambient radio waves for PNT information while also ac-
cepting baseband data from an inertial navigation system
(INS), an external time source, or directly from the user.
All extracted PNT information is fused to yield an opti-
mal navigation and timing solution. Up to this point, the
Assimilator is no different from other proposed systems for
robust navigation and timing that employ an “all available
means” philosophy. For these proposed systems, as for the
Assimilator, GPS is but one of several potential sources of
PNT data.
Having obtained a fused PNT solution, however, the As-
similator takes an unusual additional step: it embeds
the PNT solution in a consistent set of synthesized GPS
L1 C/A signals, the common-denominator of all existing
GNSS equipment. By casting its solution into this output
format, the Assimilator can deliver the additional accu-
racy, robustness, and security of its solution to any GNSS
device by simply injecting its output into the RF input
of the target device. Thus, the Assimilator acts as a con-
duit for funneling ambient PNT information to existing
GNSS equipment, without requiring hardware or software
changes to the equipment. Despite the inefficiency of re-
generating GPS RF signals after already having obtained
a PNT solution, the assimilative approach is warranted in
cases where, due to tight embedded coupling with expen-
sive downstream equipment or due to user familiarity, it
becomes more cost-effective or safer to augment existing
equipment than to replace it.
A. Assimilator Components
Figure 1 introduces the Assimilator concept in block dia-
gram form. Each subcomponent will be treated in turn.
A.1 Front-End Bank, Multi-System Receiver Module, and
Navigation and Timing Fusion Module
A bank of RF front ends digitizes segments of the RF spec-
trum containing signals that potentially bear PNT infor-
mation. Naturally, GPS, Galileo, and other GNSS sig-
nals are among these, but so are terrestrial radionaviga-
tion signals such as LORAN/eLORAN (now only outside
the U.S.) as well as communication signals from cell phone
towers or Iridium satellites—signals not originally designed
for PNT.
The digitized data exiting the RF front-end bank are
routed to a software-defined multi-system receiver module
implemented on a digital signal processor (DSP). Here,
each target signal is tracked, either independently or as
part of a vector tracking loop. The observables extracted
from each signal, including pseudorange, carrier phase,
carrier Doppler, signal strength, and navigation data, are
sent to a central navigation and timing fusion module,
which also accepts baseband PNT inputs. For each in-
put signal there exists in the fusion module an a priori
noise and signal dynamics model, enabling the data to be
optimally fused in a Bayesian estimation framework.
A.2 Anti-Spoofing Modules
Both the multi-system receiver module and the navigation
and timing fusion module are equipped with anti-spoofing
software. Module A, which resides within the multi-system
receiver module, continuously scans the RF data streams
entering the Assimilator for spoofing signatures. Module
B, which resides within the navigation and timing fusion
module, watches for inconsistencies between observables in
the centralized solution. Further details on these modules
will be given later on.
A.3 Embedded GPS Signal Simulator
The output of the navigation and timing fusion module
feeds an embedded GPS signal simulator. The embedded
signal simulator is depicted in Fig. 1 as residing partly
outside the DSP because it includes an external RF up-
conversion component. Several options are possible for
signal simulation:
Impaired GPS L1 CA If reception of GPS L1 C/A sig-
nals is impaired, then the embedded simulator can gener-
ate signal replicas in two ways:
Matched The simulator generates the same GPS L1 C/A
signals that would be visible to the Assimilator in clear
sky conditions, corrected to be consistent with the fusion
module’s PNT solution.
Fictitious The simulator generates a partially or entirely
fictitious signal set whose implied solution is consistent
with the fusion module’s PNT solution.
Unimpaired GPS L1 CA If several sufficiently strong
GPS L1 C/A signals are available in the Assimilator’s envi-
ronment, then the embedded simulator can generate clean
replicas of these, passing on to the target receiver the addi-
tional accuracy of the fused PNT solution by continually
applying corrections to the code start times and carrier
phases of the GPS L1 C/A signals. Again, there are two
options for generation:
Non-aligned No attempt is made to align the code phase
of the simulated and authentic signals.
Code-aligned The simulator generates GPS signals that
are approximately code-phase-aligned with the corre-
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Fig. 2. Expanded view of the embedded GPS signal simulator.
sponding authentic GPS L1 C/A signals at the RF input to
the target GNSS receiver. (The simulated signals are not
in general exactly code-phase aligned due to corrections
applied to match the simulated signals’ implied solution
with the fusion module’s PNT solution.) The advantage
of such alignment is that the synthesized signals appear
approximately as the authentic signals to the target re-
ceiver, which enables a user to “hot plug” the Assimilator
into a target receiver with no interruption in PNT.
An expanded view of the embedded GPS signal simulator
is shown in Fig. 2. Its subcomponents will be treated in
turn.
Control Module The control module coordinates the gen-
eration of the synthesized GPS signals by directing the
carrier phase, carrier frequency, and code phase in each
of n simulator channels. It accepts the following inputs
from the multi-system receiver module’s L1 C/A tracking
channels: the estimates {tˆk}n1 of the start times of the kth
ranging code interval on receiver channels 1-n; the esti-
mates {θˆk}n1 of the beat carrier phase on receiver chan-
nels 1-n at times {tˆk}n1 ; and the estimates {fˆD,k}n1 of the
Doppler frequency shift on receiver channels 1-n at times
{tˆk}n1 . In addition, the control module accepts the follow-
ing inputs from the fusion module: the estimated current
time T and the estimated position P and velocity V of
the Assimilator’s antenna. The control module configures
each simulator channel to generate a single GPS L1 C/A
signal with a carrier frequency and code phase that are
consistent with the fusion module’s position P , velocity V
and time T solution.
Simulator Channels Each of the n simulator channels can
be configured to generate a unique GPS C/A signal, mod-
eled as
xn(τi) = An(τi)dn(τi)Cn(τi − tn,k) (1)
×Q {sin [2pifIF τi + θn(τi)]}
θ˙n(τi = tn,k) = fD,n,k (2)
where xn(τi) is the ith sample of the signal, τi is the time of
the ith sample, An(τi) is the amplitude at τi, dn(τi) is the
navigation data bit value that applies at τi, Cn(τi − tn,k)
is the ranging code chip value that applies at τi, tn,k is
the start time of the kth ranging code interval, Q{·} is a
quantization function, fIF is the intermediate frequency,
θn(τi) is the beat carrier phase at τi, and fD,n,k is the
Doppler frequency shift at time tn,k. The ranging code
function Cn(τ) can be expressed as
Cn(τ) =
∞∑
j=−∞
cn,jΠTc(τ − jTc) (3)
and the navigation data bit function dn(τ) as
dn(τ) =
∞∑
j=−∞
dn,jΠTd(τ − jTd) (4)
where {cn,j , cn,j+1, ...} and {dn,j , dn,j+1, ...} are the unique
ranging code chip sequence and navigation data bit se-
quence corresponding to the GPS satellite whose signal is
being emulated on the nth simulator channel, Tc and Td
are the duration of one ranging code chip and one naviga-
tion data bit, and ΠT (τ) is the usual rectangular support
function equal to unity over 0 ≤ τ < T and zero otherwise.
Local Replica Generator The local replica generator gen-
erates the ranging code samples {Cn(τi)}, i = 1, 2, ..., and
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the quantized carrier replica samples
Q {sin [2pifIF τi + θn(τi)]} , i = 1, 2, 3, ... (5)
The generation of carrier replicas is described in [6]. A
command and data bus conveys phase and frequency in-
formation from the simulator channels to the local replica
generator, and returns local carrier and code replicas from
the local replica generator to the simulator channels.
Navigation Data Generator The navigation data bit se-
quence {dn,j , dn,j+1, ...} required by the nth simulator
channel is generated in one of two ways. When GPS L1
C/A signals are available, a steady stream of navigation
data bits is taken from the GPS L1 C/A channels of the
multi-system receiver module. Data bits extracted from
the authentic signals are fed to the navigation data gen-
erator and compiled into a signal-specific databit library.
If the receiver module loses lock on an authentic signal
corresponding to one being simulated, then the navigation
data generator continues to populate the simulated bit-
stream with navigation data from the data bit library, but
the library no longer gets updated as before. This con-
tinues until the control module reconfigures the simulator
channel to generate another signal.
If a simulator channel is configured to generate a signal
for which there is no recent databit library, then the nav-
igation data generator produces data bits consistent with
a standard ephemeris for the corresponding satellite. The
generator can also accept user-supplied satellite data in
the form of a databit library or a satellite ephemeris.
Sample-wise Combiner Combination of the signals gen-
erated in each of the simulator channels is performed
digitally sample-by-sample in the sample-wise combiner.
For typical Assimilator operation, all output signal are
weighted equally so that the target GPS receiver sees a set
of received signals with equal carrier-to-noise (C/N0) ra-
tios. However, the Assimilator is also capable of matching
ambient C/N0 ratios in case this information is useful for
downstream systems. In this case, the ith sample from the
nth simulator channel is weighted by the simulated ampli-
tude An(τi) and summed with the corresponding samples
from the other simulator channels, each weighted appropri-
ately. The combined signal is then re-quantized to produce
an output bitstream.
RF Upconversion Module The output bitstream of the
sample-wise combiner is routed to an RF upconversion
module comprising a digital-to-analog converter, frequency
mixers, filters, and a signal attenuator. The upconversion
module converts the digital signal into a set of synthesized
GPS signals at RF. The reference oscillator that drives the
RF upconversion module must be the same oscillator that
drives the Assimilator’s RF front-end bank.
B. Capabilities and Limitations
B.1 Accuracy
For maximum compatibility with legacy GNSS receivers,
the Assimilator outputs only GPS L1 C/A signals. The
narrow bandwidth (∼2 MHz) of the C/A ranging code
limits the accuracy of the pseudorange-based position and
time solution that the Assimilator can deliver to the target
receiver. The Assimilator compensates for this limitation
by generating synthetic signals with high C/N0 and by
selecting a constellation geometry that minimizes the geo-
metric dilution of precision (GDOP).
Suppose elevation masking in the target receiver is dis-
abled so that for any number n of synthesized signals the
optimal constellation geometry, which includes below-the-
horizon satellites, can be employed. The inverse square-
root relationship between minimum GDOP values implies
that the minimum attainable GDOP for n satellites is
GDOP(n) = GDOP(4)
√
4
n
(6)
where GDOP(4) =
√
5/2 is the minimum GDOP for 4
satellites [7].
Gains in precision due to increasing n are, unfortunately,
vitiated by a decrease in C/N0 for all signals as a conse-
quence of the interference contributed by each additional
simulated signal. Assume that signals are simulated with
equal power and that the combined signal is quantized
to one bit in the sample-wise combiner (one bit quantiza-
tion is a practical choice for signal generation on a com-
pact, low-power platform). Then one can show empirically
that the C/N0 value for each simulated signal drops from
roughly 54 dB-Hz for n = 4 to 51 dB-Hz for n = 9.
These C/N0 values can be incorporated into a ranging pre-
cision model and combined with the GDOP values from
Eq. (6) to bound the position and time precision the As-
similator can deliver to the target receiver. Figure 3 shows
this precision bound as a function of the number of simu-
lated signals. The plot indicates that under the assump-
tions presented here a precision of approximately 13 cm
is attainable. The plot further indicates that there is no
advantage in simulating more than 6 signals.
Like the precision of code phase measurements derived
from Assimilator-generated signals, carrier phase precision
is determined by the C/N0 values of the simulated signals.
For n = 6 simulated signals of equal power, the rms carrier
phase errors are less than 0.4 degrees for each signal.
Another aspect of accuracy has to do with how well the
Assimilator can eliminate the effects of ionospheric de-
lay by exploiting multiple-frequency transionospheric sig-
nals. The broadcast ionospheric model used in legacy
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single-frequency GPS receivers is known to eliminate only
about 50% of the rms ranging error [8], leaving day-side
zenith delay errors up to 10 m for a quiet ionosphere and
much worse for an active ionosphere. By contrast, stan-
dard dual-frequency L1 C/A & L2C GPS measurements
at C/N0 = 45 dB-Hz can be used to reliably estimate the
ionospheric delay to within 0.66 meters. Thus, the multi-
frequency Assimilator can pass on to a single-frequency
target receiver significant benefits in position and timing
accuracy.
B.2 Robustness
The Assimilator’s PNT solution is, by virtue of the di-
verse navigation and timing data that feed it, inherently
robust against GNSS signal obstruction and jamming. Sig-
nals from cell phone base stations, Iridium satellites, and
LORAN transmitters are tens of dB stronger than those
from GNSS satellites. Thus, not only is the Assimilator
robust to GNSS outages, it can also withstand substantial
blockage, jamming, or other interference in the cell phone
(1.9 GHz), Iridium (1.6 GHz), and LORAN (100 kHz)
frequency bands. Naturally, in a complete GNSS signal
blackout, the PNT solution that the Assimilator feeds to
the target receiver will be degraded, but by leveraging non-
GNSS navigation and timing sources, the Assimilator lim-
its this degradation substantially. Baseband aiding from
an INS or stable frequency reference lowers the Assimila-
tor’s tracking threshold for GNSS signals and permits the
Assimilator to “coast” through periods of complete RF
blackout.
Ionospheric scintillation poses another challenge for GNSS
receiver robustness. The deep power fades and accompa-
nying fast phase transitions induced by equatorial iono-
spheric scintillation stress a receiver’s carrier tracking
loops, and, as severity increases, can lead to navigation
bit errors, cycle slipping, and complete loss of carrier lock.
The Assimilator makes best use of incoming GNSS signals
by incorporating carrier phase tracking loops that are spe-
cially designed for scintillation robustness (for maximum
navigation accuracy, all carrier tracking loops within the
Assimilator track carrier phase, not just frequency). One
simple technique for extending the mean time between cy-
cle slips (and decreasing the chances of frequency unlock)
is to wipe off the navigation data bits from data-bearing
channels so that a traditional full-cycle carrier tracking
loop can be employed instead of a half-cycle Costas loop
[9]. The navigation data generator within the Assimi-
lator’s embedded signal simulator stores a signal-specific
data bit library for each GPS L1 C/A signal. Because the
C/A navigation message repeats every 12.5 minutes, this
library can be used to predict the value of data bits that
are received during scintillation-induced power fades. A
network connection on the Assimilator permits data bit
libraries to be downloaded from a remote server. Also, the
Assimilator benefits from access to modernized GNSS sig-
nals whose pilot (data-free) channels are by design more
scintillation-robust than the legacy GPS C/A signal.
B.3 Security
As with robustness, the Assimilator is inherently more se-
cure against signal spoofing than legacy civil GNSS re-
ceivers because of the diverse data from which its PNT
solution is derived. In Ref. [4] it was demonstrated that
developing a portable single-frequency civil GPS spoofer
is relatively straightforward, but carrying out a successful
spoofing attack becomes much more difficult when multiple
signal types must be spoofed simultaneously. The Assim-
ilator’s anti-spoofing module B, which resides within the
navigation and timing fusion module, exploits this inher-
ent security by comparing the observables output by each
of the receivers in the multi-system receiver module. The
module looks for outliers in pseudorange measurements in
an extension of the popular receiver-autonomous integrity
monitoring (RAIM) algorithm.
At a lower level in the processing chain, the Assimilator’s
anti-spoofing module A, which resides within the multi-
system receiver module, monitors the individual incoming
data streams for irregular behavior, employing, for exam-
ple, the data bit latency and vestigial signal defenses in-
troduced in [4], the multi-antenna defense introduced in
[2], or the signal quality monitoring technique introduced
in [10].
Stronger civil spoofing defenses than these require crypto-
graphic signal authentication. Over the last decade, GNSS
security researchers have proposed techniques for naviga-
tion message and spreading code authentication [3,11], and
authentication based on exploiting the known relationship
between GPS C/A signals and the encrypted GPS Y code
on L1 [12]. Of these, navigation message authentication
(NMA) appears to be the most practical while still pro-
viding a strong defense against spoofing.
6
The primary objection to civil NMA as applied to GPS is
that it would require a change to the GPS signal-in-space
specification, otherwise known as the GPS interface con-
trol document (ICD). However, NMA could in fact be in-
troduced in a way that is fully compatible with the current
ICD by exploiting the flexible L2 or L5 navigation message
structure. In this approach, one of the presently undefined
navigation messages would be allocated for transmission of
a digital signature. The GPS Control Segment would gen-
erate a public and private key pair, publishing the public
key and keeping the private key secret. Users would down-
load the public key from a trusted repository. With the
private key, the Control Segment would digitally sign all
navigation data messages transmitted between the kth and
(k+1)th digital signature message. The signature, at least
128 bits long for adequate security, would be transmitted
to the user in the payload of the (k + 1)th signature mes-
sage.
With this scheme, users could periodically authenticate
all navigation data bits modulated on a given signal. Fur-
thermore, only a slight extension to the GPS ICD would
be required: an additional paragraph would be added to
define the new digital-signature-bearing message
The Assimilator could be adapted to implement the al-
gorithm that verifies the received digital signature. Thus,
by combining the Assimilator with navigation message au-
thentication on the GPS L2C or L5 signals, legacy GNSS
receivers could be cryptographically secured against GPS
spoofing attacks.
Whether by cryptographic means or otherwise, if the As-
similator detects a spoofing attack it alerts the user and
excludes the spoofed signals from its internal PNT esti-
mate. The synthesized GPS signals that the Assimilator
continuously sends to the target receiver are accordingly
spoof-free, and the target receiver is protected from the
spoofing attack.
II. PROTOTYPE ASSIMILATOR
A prototype Assimilator has been built to prove the basic
feasibility of the conceptual Assimilator introduced above.
The prototype is an extension of the GRID software-
defined GNSS receiver introduced in [13] and [14] and the
GPS spoofer introduced in [4]. The following two subsec-
tions will describe the prototype and offer initial experi-
mental results.
A. Description
The prototype Assimilator is a dual-frequency device with
a rudimentary spoofing defense. Its embedded signal sim-
ulator generates output signals in the code-aligned, unim-
paired GPS L1 C/A simulation mode. The device receives
L1 C/A and L2C GPS signals and outputs L1 C/A signals
with code phases corrected for ionospheric delay. Figure 4
Fig. 4. Top: The prototype Assimilator device connected to a GPS
time reference receiver. Lower left: Screen shot of a software GPS
receiver tracking the Assimilator output and of the GPS time ref-
erence receiver’s status page showing a timing lock. Lower right:
The Assimilator’s DSP core. This single chip performs all processing
required for both signal tracking and signal generation.
shows a picture of the prototype assimilator coupled to a
GPS time reference receiver. The lower right panel of Fig.
4 is a close-up of the DSP chip that simultaneously han-
dles dual-frequency signal acquisition and tracking, and
single-frequency signal simulation.
A.1 Multi-System Receiver Module
Though it currently only tracks GPS L1 C/A and L2C
signals, the prototype Assimilator’s multi-system receiver
module is designed for expansion. Written in object-
oriented C++, the module’s principal feature is an exten-
sible array of so-called Bank objects, each of which acts as
an independent software receiver. Class polymorphism is
exploited so that all Bank objects share a common struc-
ture.
Figure 5 illustrates the principal components of the Bank
object. Data from each RF front end are stored in sepa-
rate data buffers, with sub-buffers assigned to each of the
front ends’ quantization bits. The prototype uses two-bit
quantization but its processing algorithms can be adapted
for N -bit quantization. Each data buffer feeds a separate
Bank object, of which the prototype Assimilator has two:
one for GPS L1 C/A and one for GPS L2C. Each Bank
object, in turn, houses an array of Channel objects, one
for each independent signal to be tracked. Channel ob-
jects are made up of phase, frequency, and code tracking
loop objects and other supporting members. All Channel
objects within a Bank feed into a single Observables ob-
ject that encapsulates the observables extracted from the
signals to which the Bank is devoted. Each Bank object
feeds a sequence of Observables objects to the navigation
and timing fusion module for fusion into a single PNT so-
lution.
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Fig. 5. Software objects within the prototype implementation of the multi-system receiver and the navigation and timing fusion modules.
A.2 Navigation and Timing Fusion Module
The prototype Assimilator fuses dual-frequency GPS mea-
surements into a single-frequency simulated GPS RF out-
put by re-generating clean versions of the C/A signals that
it tracks and by compensating for ionospheric delay on
each of the simulated signals.
Only 8 L2C-capable GPS satellite are currently in orbit,
which implies that direct measurements of the L1 iono-
spheric delay are not available for all satellite-to-receiver
paths. To compensate for ionospheric delay in all sim-
ulated signals, the prototype Assimilator uses whatever
dual-frequency measurements are available to adjust the
parameters of a simple single-layer ionospheric model. De-
lay estimates drawn from this model are then applied to
adjust the code phase of simulated signals. No attempt
is made at present to compensate for ionospheric-induced
advances in the simulated signals’ carrier phases.
A.3 Anti-Spoofing
For anti-spoofing, the prototype Assimilator implements
the data bit latency defense [4,10] and a phase trauma in-
dicator. The simple data bit latency defense is premised
on the difficulty of (1) predicting or synthesizing a con-
sistent stream of navigation data bits for each signal, or
(2) re-transmitting the broadcast GPS data bits with an
undetectable latency. In the prototype Assimilator’s im-
plementation of the defense, Channel objects continuously
monitor each navigation data bit stream and flag suspi-
cious shifts in bit synchronization. The defense is far from
foolproof, but it is simple to implement and substantially
raises the bar for a successful spoofing attack.
The Assimilator’s phase trauma indicator is simply an im-
plementation of the phase lock indicator introduced in [15].
Like the data bit latency defense, the phase trauma indica-
tor is simple to implement yet difficult to avoid triggering
during a spoofing attack. A triggering of the phase trauma
indicator during an interval of high nominal carrier-to-
noise ratio raises suspicion of a spoofing attack.
A.4 Embedded Signal Simulator
The prototype Assimilator’s embedded signal simulator
functions just as described earlier for the conceptual As-
similator except that the prototype makes no attempt to
choose the best possible combination of signals to simu-
late; it simply selects the strongest n tracked C/A signals
(usually 8) for simulation.
B. Preliminary Performance Results
B.1 Processing Demands
When tuned for efficiency, the prototype Assimilator meets
real-time deadlines with computational resources to spare.
The processing power of the prototype’s DSP is such that
it can run the equivalent of 135 parallel GPS C/A chan-
nels. Because their longer ranging codes cannot be stored
in on-chip memory, L2C channels require the equivalent
processing of 4 C/A channels. More expensive still are the
simulator channels, each of which requires an equivalent
of 5.4 C/A channels. At full capability, the Assimilator
can track 14 GPS L1 C/A signals and 14 GPS L2C sig-
nals while simultaneously generating 8 simulation signals,
in addition to performing a 1-Hz navigation solution and
periodic background acquisition.
B.2 Power Requirements
Of the prototype’s hardware subsystems, the DSP and its
peripherals, unsurprisingly, draw the most power, requir-
ing 6 W. The dual-frequency RF front end draws 2 W.
A separate single-board computer used for network com-
munications, remote reprogrammability, and housekeeping
draws 1.3 W. The RF upconversion module draws less than
700 mW. Thus, the total power draw of the prototype As-
similator is less than 10 W.
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III. USAGE EXAMPLES
A. Protecting a Time Reference Receiver from an
Unsophisticated Spoofing Attack
As a first usage example, consider the Assimilator as an in-
line anti-spoofing module. The top panel of Fig. 4 shows
the Assimilator in this role protecting a time reference GPS
receiver. The Assimilator monitors incoming GPS signals
and raises a flag upon detection of irregularities in the start
time of the navigation data bits or upon detection of phase
trauma not explained by low C/N0 values. As long as this
flag remains unasserted, the time reference receiver has a
reasonable assurance that its pulse-per-second output is
properly synchronized with true GPS time.
B. Reducing Ionospheric Errors in Single-Frequency
Target Receivers
A dual-frequency Assimilator can reduce ionospheric errors
in a single-frequency target receiver to which it is attached.
An experiment involving ionospheric delay modeling errors
was conducted to illustrate the utility of the prototype
Assimilator in this role. The experiment was carried out
in after-the-fact processing on a desktop PC running the
Assimilator code. A dual-frequency front end identical to
that of the prototype Assimilator was used to digitize 300
seconds of dual-frequency data from a high-quality GPS
signal simulator. The signal simulator’s scenario profile
was set to generate signals consistent with a Klobuchar
ionospheric model with low electron content (∼2 meters
zenith delay at L1). Data from the signal simulator were
used to ensure a well-defined truth position. After-the-fact
processing was required since the GPS signal simulator and
the prototype Assimilator were not co-located.
The Assimilator ingested the dual-frequency digital data
and generated a combined set of output signals. These
were routed to a software-defined single-frequency GPS
receiver (the target receiver) whose internal ionospheric
model had been disabled. Midway through the run, the
Assimilator began compensating for ionospheric delay by
adjusting the code phase of its simulated signals. Prior to
this moment, the target receiver showed positioning errors
of approximately 3 meters, mostly in the altitude compo-
nent. To the target receiver it appeared as though there
was a mismatch between the broadcast ionospheric model
and the true ionosphere. However, when the Assimilator
activated its dual-frequency-based ionospheric compensa-
tion, the target receiver’s altitude errors were immediately
reduced. Figure 6 plots the altitude error time history.
Clearly, even with this experiment’s low-electron-content
ionosphere, the target receiver benefited from its coupling
to the Assimilator.
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Fig. 6. Time history of altitude errors within an Assimilator-aided
single-frequency receiver. Midway through the processing run the
Assimilator activates ionospheric compensation, reducing the target
receiver’s altitude errors by approximately 2.5 meters.
Assimilator Prototype II
Fig. 7. The alternate prototype Assimilator setup. A general-
purpose wideband dual-frequency front-end feeds data to a desk-
top processor in which the Assimilator processing takes place. The
CDMA cellular antenna can be seen atop the RAID storage array.
C. Weak-Signal Tracking via CDMA Cellular Sig-
nal Aiding
In a third example application, the Assimilator was con-
figured to receive code division multiple access (CDMA)
cellular telephone signals from nearby towers. This ap-
plication required an alternate prototype Assimilator, pic-
tured in Fig. 7, with a front-end capable of simultaneously
receiving the GPS L1 and 1900-2000 MHz cell telephone
bands. This setup allows the Assimilator to exploit the
native frequency stability of the CDMA cell telephone sig-
nals to compensate for frequency instability within its own
(inexpensive) local oscillator. Adequate compensation for
frequency instability permits the long coherent integration
intervals required to track GNSS signals with low C/N0.
Thus, the Assimilator enables GNSS use deep indoors or in
environments where GNSS may be subject to interference.
Figure 8 illustrates in block diagram form the processing
required to exploit the cellular aiding signal. Weak GNSS
signals are despread and down-converted based on approx-
imate knowledge of receiver position and time. The com-
parably much stronger cell telephone signals are tracked
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Fig. 8. Block diagram illustrating the technique of exploiting stable
CDMA cellular signals of opportunity to extend the coherence time
of a low-cost local oscillator.
with an independent set of code and carrier tracking loops
to extract estimates of the shift in beat carrier phase that
occurs over each GNSS intermediate accumulation inter-
val. The phase shift estimates, after proper scaling, drive
a rotation of the complex intermediate GNSS signal accu-
mulations, thereby compensating for local-clock-induced
phase shifts over the intermediate accumulation intervals.
The benefit of this frequency stability transfer technique
is evident in Fig. 9, which shows the pre-detection signal-
to-noise ratio (SNR) as a function of integration time for
a GPS signal with nominal C/N0 = 7 dB-Hz as tracked
by a receiver driven by several different local oscillators.
The short coherence time of the low-cost temperature-
compensated crystal oscillator (TCXO) prevents the pre-
detection SNR from ever reaching thresholds required for
acquisition and tracking. By contrast, the black trace,
which corresponds to an oven-controlled crystal oscilla-
tor (OCXO) with a coherence time exceeding 100 seconds,
easily meets the thresholds. Likewise, a CDMA-cellular-
signal-aided low-cost local oscillator can sustain long co-
herence times, as indicated by the CDMA1 and CDMA2
traces. Interestingly, the relatively poor performance of
CDMA2 compared with CDMA1 suggests that not all
base-station-transmitted cellular signals are of equivalent
stability.
By extending the coherence time of its local clock, the As-
similator is able to track severely attenuated GNSS signals
in indoor environments and, in turn, pass on to the tar-
get receiver a set of strong GNSS signals whose implied
timing and positioning solution is of useful accuracy. This
technique of opportunistic frequency stability transfer for
extending the coherence time of inexpensive GNSS receiver
clocks is described in further detail in [16].
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A technique has been presented for upgrading existing
GNSS user equipment, without requiring hardware or soft-
ware modifications to the equipment, to improve its accu-
Fig. 9. Pre-detection SNR as a function of integration time for a
GNSS receiver driven by several different local oscillators. The two
dashed horizontal lines show pre-detection SNR thresholds for reli-
able acquisition and tracking; see [16] for details on the threshold val-
ues. CDMA1 and CDMA2 refer to the local oscillator as “fixed up”
by stable CDMA cellular signals. SYXO refers to single-differenced
GPS carrier phase playing the role of the local oscillator and repre-
sents a limiting case for coherent integration: atmospheric variations
and GPS satellite clock instability prevent pre-detection SNR from
rising any faster than this trace.
racy, to increase its robustness in weak-signal or jammed
environments, and to secure it against counterfeit GNSS
signals. The technique is embodied in a device called
the GPS Assimilator that acts opportunistically to extract
navigation and timing information from its environment.
The Assimilator encodes this information into a set of stan-
dard GPS L1 C/A signals with which all legacy GNSS
receivers are natively compatible. A dual-frequency pro-
totype Assimilator with a rudimentary spoofing defense
has been presented. Initial experimental results show the
prototype successfully correcting ionospheric errors in a
single-frequency target receiver and suggest that, by ex-
ploiting the native frequency stability of cell telephone sig-
nals, the Assimilator can enable indoor GNSS reception.
Efforts are underway to develop the next-generation As-
similator prototype: a compact device equipped with a ro-
bust cryptographic defense against spoofing and capable
of tracking dual-frequency GPS and CDMA cell telephone
signals. Eventually, as board sizes are reduced, the Assim-
ilator’s processing core can be housed within its antenna
enclosure, offering GNSS users the possibility of upgrading
their current receivers with a simple change of antenna.
V. END NOTES
The assimilator concept and early hardware were devel-
oped at Coherent Navigation, Inc., a startup company of
which Dr. Ledvina and Dr. Humphreys are co-founders,
along with four others. Coherent Navigation Inc. has filed
a patent covering the assimilator concept and related tech-
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